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I. INTRODUCTION
Two years after Mao Zedong's death in 1976 a new leadership
began steering China away from Mao's revolutionary communism toward
a "second revolution" in economic reform, and toward reestablishing the
mediation and legal institutions destroyed during the preceding years.' The
Reform movement, as it became known in the West, was a significant
experiment in economic and legal change: it moved the largest society
toward a combined socialist and market economy and a mixed socialist
and western style legal system.2
The declaration of martial law, the massacre of demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square in early June 1989, 3 the persecution and show trials of
dissidents, and the close monitoring of civilian movement in Beijing,4
evidence that the Chinese leadership was unprepared to accept the political
implications of the Reform movement. While the events at Tianamnen
Square startled foreign governments as well as business and academic
supporters of the Reform movement, other analysts noted a broader
context for the crackdown; economic problems had previously caused a
reassertion of centralized Communist Party decision making, a general
tightening of central authority, and a call for discipline in Chinese politics
and economic life.'
In the dozen Reform years prior to Tiananmen Square, 1977-89,
mediation was relatively depoliticized as compared to its past use and was
subjected to legislative procedural rules and administrative oversight.
Today, mediation is widely practiced in China by hundreds of thousands
of People's Mediation Committees as part of a domestic social welfare
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process. These Committees operate under rules established by the Justice
Ministries of local governments. Mediation is also a routine part of the
judicial process, called "in-court mediation," and is also part of an
expanding Chinese arbitration practice. It is, in fact, embedded in all the
formal Chinese dispute settlement systems: the judicial, administrative,
and arbitration processes.
This article explores the Chinese practice of civil dispute
resolution. Particularly, it will focus on the role of mediation as an
alternative dispute settlement practice and the recent development of
Chinese legal institutions. The paper begins with a description of the
effects of the post-Mao reforms on China's public mediation systems.
After reviewing the history of the communist's strategic use of mediation
from the Communist Party's formative years to the Cultural Revolution,
this paper describes the effects that China's Reform movement over the
past dozen years had on the legal system and on mediation practices.
Three dispute resolution practices are reviewed: the People's Mediation
Committee system, the In-Court Mediation system of the People's Courts,
and the use of mediation and arbitration to resolve commercial disputes in
the People's Republic.
II. THE POST-MAO REFORM MOVEMENT
The Chinese government, led by Deng Xiaoping, declared martial
law in Beijing in 1989 and fiercely suppressed political dialogue. Not
inconsistently, that same leadership had previously been regarded as the
sponsor and architect of the Reform movement that led China from a
stagnant communism into an era of economic development and of
rapprochement with the West. Deng had been popularly regarded as
China's economic liberator since 1978 when his group took control of the
government and began the rationalization of Chinese economic and social
life as a post-Mao Reform movement. The concentration on economic
liberalization and reform did not, however, as events showed, presage
immediate acceptance of political diversity and tolerance of dissonance.
Since 1978, economic reform has been encouraged, while political reform
has been suppressed. 6 The Chinese economic reform has been evidenced
by both introduction of a market oriented "enterprise" system for new
industrial and commercial development as well as a "responsibility
system" that encourages private entrepreneurship in rural collective
6. HARDING, supra note 2, at 99, 174.
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farming." The opening of China to western investors has also made
economic reforms within China more visible.
The connections between economic reform policies and reform of
the legal system are evident. Contract, property, and economic relations
laws were, by the late 1970's, understood to be essential to the creation of
any version of a market economy. But, the country's legal institutions had
been particular targets during Mao Zedong's Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution 1965-76. By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the legal
profession had virtually disappeared in China: courts were not
functioning, and those judges who had not been purged (jailed or sent to
work as field laborers) were low-level Party cadres who decided cases on
ideological principles. The People's Mediation System functioned as an
instrument of political control at the "grassroots" level, in residential
blocks or factory work groups.9 A functioning governmental dispute
resolution and legal system did not exist in China in 1975.
In reaction to the destruction of the institutions of this period,
Deng's Reform in the late 1970's and throughout the 1980's sought to
establish a functioning legal system to rationalize society and thus provide
a base for expanded international trade and internal economic
development. During the 1980's, a revised national constitution, making
significant reference to the rule of law and to individual procedural rights,
was adopted,10 as was a code of civil procedure," and dozens of laws
establishing or regulating economic rights and transactions. Furthermore,
considerable emphasis was placed on the rehabilitation of the courts,
creation of new court systems, and on the reconstruction of the legal
profession, including law schools, which had been abandoned during the
Cultural Revolution.
7. Phyllis L. Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors that Chinese Courts in the
Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101,
Summer (1989).
8. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTs (1985).
9. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the People's
Mediation Committee system.
10. THE CONST. OF THE P.R.C., translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 821204 (1983).
11. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW PROVISIONAL, translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of
the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 820308 (1982) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW].
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III. COMMUNIST MEDIATION 1927-76
From the beginnings of the Communist Revolution to the end of
the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese communists' used mediation as an
instrument of state policy. This section briefly reviews the politicized use
of the legal and mediation systems in China that were prevalent, with
brief exceptions, prior to the post-Mao Reform period. While the most
ideologically oriented uses of mediation were discarded during the 1980's,
the social and political roles of the current mediation systems were created
in the revolutionary period and during the first decades of communist
rule.
A. Mediation Committees and Political Organization
A primary concern of researchers of communist mediation practice
must be the degree to which mediation was, or is, used to promote state
or party interests in conflict with the interests of disputants. During the
long Communist Revolution, 1927-49, mediation practice evolved as one
element of a strategy to organize rural communities into closely knit social
and political units. The People's Mediation Committees evolved from
several revolutionary communist objectives: these objectives included
creating a socialist dispute settlement system (a proletarian justice system
replacing a judicial bureaucracy of elites), developing a political system of
"mass organizations" to disseminate the highly centralized communist
ideology, and extending Mao's command and control structure across a
vast rural populace.2 The "mass organizations" were officially described
as nongovernmental political committees; but in fact, they were utilized as
a government tool by the Communist Party - a network of committees set
up to extend political organization and its attendant rewards, sanctions,
and controls to the smallest feasible group level. The program was, and to
a considerable extent still is, run by Party cadres although the many
changes in China in the 1980's have reoriented the radical communist
messages of the early mass organizations.
The mass organizations originated in the National People's
Congress, the governing body. Today, at each level of government, they
extend in a hierarchical series of political committees down to the street
level. These mass organizations constitute a vast social-political structure
transmitting Party policy to the populace ultimately at the level of small
12. Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in
Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284 (1967).
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groups. Each municipality, village, commune, and factory is organized
into committees and has subunits that report upward. In urban areas the
structure grows from the level of the Street Committee to the
Neighborhood Committee (representing approximately two thousand
people), to the district level, and to the municipality.U These "mass
organizations," elected by local residents with leadership by Party cadres,
were originally designed to transmit Party ideology and policy to the
people. They have, however, added practical social functions. At the
street level, the Street and Neighborhood Committees collect refuse and
rents, maintain the street, and perform social welfare functions that
include allocating housing, undertaking instruction in the content of
domestic law, and performing civil dispute mediation.14
Thus, the People's Mediation Committees, offshoots of the general
Neighborhood Committees, are also units of the "mass organizations." In
the People's Mediation System, each urban neighborhood, rural village,
and labor unit in a commune has a formally organized mediation
committee with the avowed purpose of assisting disputants in settling their
conflicts. Their idealized social function, as characterized by a friendly
observer in the late 1960's, was to offer a communally based dispute
settlement service, to be an integrative unit in the community, to be a
welfare service, and to provide an important medium of contact between
alienated or deviant individuals and the community.Bs If individuals
showed signs of deviant behavior, third party help was immediately
provided. According to Victor Li,' 6 the mediation committees' unique
"welfare" function was providing a support network for troubled
individuals by heading off social conflict through early interventions. The
intimacy of social intervention by mediators of this model supposedly
provided a support network for individuals. Early intervention in child
deviant behavior cases, in marital conflict cases, or in in-law conflict
cases, or in neighbor dispute cases, purportedly led to a highly successful
social resolution of these cases. Thus, early intervention, which was called
"on the spot" mediation because it took place before the conflict had time
to ripen and get worse, heads off unnecessary conflicts and maintains
social stability.'7
13. Cheng Gang, The Neighborhood Committee - Residents' Own Organization, BEIJING
REV., April 9-15, 1990 at 26.
14. Id. at 27.
15. VIcrOR H. Li, The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal System, in
CHINA MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY SoCIEN 221-55 (John M.H. Lindbeck ed.,
1971).
16. See supra note 15.
17. VICOR H. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS (1978).
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B. Ideology and Control
Stanley Lubman has argued persuasively that mediation in
Communist China developed as a means of implementing the Party's
substantive policies and objectives of organizing, directing, and controlling
the population through instruments of "mass organization.""' He asserted
that the essential characteristic of the mediation committees and the entire
mediation process was primarily to accomplish state aims and not to serve
disputants' interests.
While mediation was aimed at resolving disputes, maintaining
public order, and ending "bad feelings" among disputants, Lubman
identified three other functions of mediation: "it [mediation] serves to
articulate the ideological principles, values, and programs of the Chinese
Communist Party . . . it serves to suppress rather than settle [certain]
disputes between individuals.. . it supplements [as a behavior monitoring
and reporting device] other means of control [police, cadres with power to
sanction] exercised by the state and Party apparatus. "19 For example,
communist practice discouraged and officially denigrated negotiation and
bargaining as "unprincipled" mediation. The Party sanctioned only
"principled" mediation, meaning mediation following ideologically
"correct" policy. An example of the use of mediation to further state
interests was the use of the mediation committees in the mid-1950's to
settle disputes among peasants over allocation of water, timber, and tools
following land redistribution and collectivization. This use furthered the
Party's interests in rapid collectivization and in the use of mediation
committees "persuading doubters of the advantages of cooperativization
• . . [m]ediation committees were used to extol communal living, increase
commune members' commitment to communalization, and reduce disputes
which interfered with production."'
C. Abuses of the Dispute Resolution System
The first Chinese Communist Constitution was adopted in 1954. It
provided for limited individual rights in court proceedings - such as the
right to an open trial, and right to a defense, for an independent judiciary,
and for general adherence to the rule of law. In this period of emergent
legalism, the formally adopted Provisional Rules Governing the
Organization of People's Mediation Committees (1954) required voluntary
18. See generally Lubman, supra note 12.
19. Lubman, supra note 12 at 1339.
20. Lubman, supra note 12 at 1340.
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participation in mediation and the opportunity for parties to choose to go
to trial subsequently. t
Rejecting the emergent legalist program, Mao, in the Anti-Rightist
movement (1957-58), explicitly rejected the legalist approach in favor of
development of "proletarian" legal and dispute resolution systems.n Mao's
rhetoric emphasized the dangers of the Right, which included
bureaucracy, class oppression, and the continuing need for class struggle
against the enemies of the Party. Instead of a rule of law, Mao promoted
the "rule of men," an ideology of the "mass line," which included mass
participation in law making and law application as well as decisions made
by Party cadres. Consistent with his anti-bureaucratic or anti-rule oriented
theory of mass participation in government, he favored replacing judges
that were trained in law with untrained workers, who would decide cases
on the facts and with reference to Party policy.
As to cases before the court, Mao rejected decisions that applied
rules and standards. Instead, most court decisions analyzed the "concrete
situation." The "concrete situation" consisted of the facts as determined at
the site of the dispute or alleged crime and the attitudes of the people
most proximate to the case - neighbors, coworkers, local committeemen,
and Party cadres.
Believing in constant revolution and struggle as an efficient means
to move Chinese society, in the Anti-Rightist movement (1957-58) and in
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Mao endorsed the
purges, removal, and frequent persecution of bureaucrats, and court
personnel, who were in positions of authority. During the Cultural
Revolution, the pre-established People's Court system was bypassed in
favor of ad hoc "revolutionary" judicial processes. Thus, cases were less
often decided based on the law than on the Party line as interpreted by
cadres. Whereas trials were held only to publicize decisions in cases
where Party officials desired to "educate" the public, the actual case
decisions were made in nonpublic meetings of judges and Party cadres.2u
Consequently, mass trials were staged where hundreds or thousands of
"convicted" people were "encouraged" and "persuaded" to confess in front
of crowds of thousands.
Mediation Committee activities were also highly politicized during
the Cultural Revolution. Because mediation was no longer a voluntary and
noncoercive process, it became a means to identify deviant behavior and
to "persuade" and "educate" the masses about "correct" Party ideology.
21. See CIviL. PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 14 (a later version of these rules).
22. HARDING, supra note 2, at 28.
23. Martin Garbus, Justice Without Courts a Report on China Today, 60 JUDICATURE
395 (1977).
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Mediation committee work was politicized, directive, and less concerned
with peacemaking and dispute settlement than with ideological objectives.
Mediation was no longer a means for dispute resolution. "The real
resolution of disputes occurred in the streets... in struggle sessions,
wall poster displays, and informal dispute adjustment techniques in local
units. "2 According to some accounts, political persuasion by
Neighborhood Committees and Party cadres during the Cultural
Revolution was so unrestrained that parties in civil disputes who ran afoul
of the Red Guards were verbally abused, beaten, and sometimes trans-
ported to distant camps, and never seen again.2s Neighborhood groups
used "struggle sessions" to "reeducate" and "persuade" "antisocial" group
members to change their anti-state attitudes by shouting at them or beating
them.' 4 In an article written prior to the Cultural Revolution, Stanley
Lubman described the situation:
[The] report makes clear the Party's intent to use dispute
resolution as a political instrument to mobilize support for the
Communist Party among the peasants. The politicalization of
mediation is evident in the emphasis on class warfare, on cadres
serving the masses, of changing the thought of disputants by
changing their attitude(s)Y
After Mao's death, one of the most important goals of the new
Party leadership was to reform the legal system, including the dispute
resolution system. Today, there are three major dispute processing
institutions in China: the People's Mediation Committee system covers
domestic and workplace disputes, the People's Courts handle both civil
and criminal cases, and the government administrative agencies include
Arbitration Commissions as well as general regulatory adjudication
agencies. The sections below describe how arenas for dispute processing
have changed during the first decade of reform in China.
IV. REFORM OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRACTICES
Reform of the Chinese legal system in the 1980's in many cases
restructured dispute settlement procedures. The new statutes, incorporating
24. Id. at 398.
25. Fox BUTTERFIELD, CHINA ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA (1982).
26. Id.
27. Lubman, supra note 12, at 1284.
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and extending previously "temporary" laws and policies, established
standards that affected both court procedures and mediation practices. For
example, prior to the Reform movement, the essentially political character
of mediation routinely allowed Mediation Committees to be directly
controlled by Communist Party cadres. During the period of reform, the
government moved to rationalize the operation of the hundreds of
thousands of informal mediation systems, to codify procedures, and, at
least compared to past conditions, to reduce abuses of the mediation
system.
In China, mediation is perceived as a requirement for government
agencies, schools, and businesses; neighborhood, factory, and village
nongovernmental organizations; and more formal dispute settlement
institutions - courts and arbitration panels. Because mediation has long
traditions in Chinese culture, it provides the basic paradigms guiding the
processing of most civil disputes in China. The sections below describe
the arenas for dispute processing in China and illustrate that the changes
initiated in the decade of Reform have affected mediation practices in each
of the different settings.
A. The People's Mediation Committees
The People's Mediation Committee system has no analog in the
West. It is a massive state sponsored system organized to promote
settlements in domestic and workplace disputes and to further Communist
Party interests in current social policies. Technically, the People's
Mediation Committees are nongovernmental organizations. But the central
government, through the Justice Department, establishes broad policy for
the Committees. Furthermore, the Provincial and major urban
governments have direct policy control over the Committees, which
regard themselves as nongovernmental "mass" organizations.
Committees are formed to service natural social groups: the most
common are Neighborhood Mediation Committees in urban areas, Village
Committees in rural areas, and Mediation Committees in factories or other
work places. The number of these committees is staggering: the total in
China is approximately seven hundred fifty thousand. Committees can be
found in most neighborhoods (approximately two thousand residents),
28. L, supra note 15, at 59.
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factories, office work sites, subunits of agricultural communes, rural
Townships, and villages.2
The Committees generally have three to eleven members, who are
elected for terms of two years by voters in the group serviced by that
committee. Still, committee members (called mediators) frequently serve
several terms. Most mediation positions are voluntary and not paid.3
Qualifications for selection (election) are presumed to be "fairness, some
knowledge of the law, and good relations with the people." 1 Overall there
are more than four million designated mediators in the country.3
The People's Mediation Committees usually deal with civil
disputes, but occasionally they are asked to intercede in minor criminal
cases. Thus, their cases typically involve disputes between family
members, coworkers, or neighbors. A recent government survey found
that forty-seven percent of cases were marital disputes; fifteen percent
were other family disputes; fifteen percent involved housing disputes;
thirteen percent were neighborhood disputes; and ten percent of the cases
were disputes in the area of management/production.3 The Mediation
Committees are so pervasive as part of ordinary life in China that their
function is well integrated into domestic affairs.'
In their own analysis of the impacts of the Mediation Committees,
government officials have claimed that the Committees resolved almost
seven million disputes in 1987, including sixty-eight thousand cases that
would likely have escalated into serious criminal cases if mediation had
not been available. They further estimate that one hundred three thousand
unnatural deaths (mostly suicides) were prevented through mediator
intercession. s In addition, state analysts claim that besides significantly
reducing court caseloads Mediation Committees serve as community study
29. Deputy Director of Mediation Department, Ministry of Justice Liu Zhitao, Address
to Delegation of U.S. Practitioners of Alternative Dispute Resolution (May 30, 1988). See
also Mediation Settles 6.47m Civil Disputes, CHINA DAILY, August 19, 1986, at 1 (1984
statistics).
30. The general rule is that Mediation Committees shall not charge for services. FBIS
Organic Rules Promulgated for Mediation Committees, art. 11, (1989) states "People's
mediation committees shall not collect any fee for mediating civil disputes." However, in an
innovation, the new enterprise "contract system" has been applied to mediation. "[Miany
villages have entered into agreements with their mediation committees whereby, upon
meeting certain objectives such as reduction of the number of conflicts, mediators can
themselves earn yearly cash awards." Song Tallang & Philippe Gagnon, Mediation
Committees are Revitalized, CHINA DAILY, December 31, 1986 at 1.
31. Li, supra note 15, at 59.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cheng Gang, The Neighborhood Committee - Residents' Own Organization, BEIJING
REviEw, April 9-15 at 26.
35. Mediation Settles 6.47m Civil Disputes, CHINA DAILY, August 19, 1986, at 1.
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centers on the law, disseminate the law to the people, and educate the
people in good social policy - all of which are important state purposes.
The People's Mediation Committees have carved out a unique role
in Chinese society: they act as monitors in maintaining the fabric of social
life in China. Again, they have no real counterpart in the West. Mediation
Committees attempt to head off domestic disputes before they escalate;
and they may act as "on the spot" social welfare agency or rescue squad
representatives. They function by monitoring relations in the family and at
the workplace. This level of inquiry would be intrusive to Westerners. If
attention is called to a disturbance between individuals, a mediator will
attempt to intercede, find out the facts, and then move the individuals
toward reconciliation.
B. Privacy, Party Interests, and Mediation
Privacy rights, including, most importantly, "the right to be let
alone," are not dominant themes in Chinese domestic life.36 Mediation
Committee work is rooted in the traditional Chinese values of the
maintenance of interpersonal relationships and of social group harmony.
To these traditional concepts, the Communists added the political role of
the Mediation Committees which acted as transmitters of the social norms
approved by the government and Party policy objectives. A mediator is
more than a neutral third party: he or she, at least in part, is recognized
as a conveyor of "correct" policy. This political role was exaggerated
during the Cultural Revolution, where mediation was arguably most
heavily influenced by politics and compulsion.' Indeed, in the 1960's,
western observers of Chinese mediation often noted that it was little more
than direct state sponsored control of individuals at the level of the
smallest social group.3 During the Cultural Revolution, mediators were
Party cadres, who used disputes as vehicles to publicize "correct" state
policy and to punish disputants who were on the "wrong" side of that
policy.
In 1991, while Mediation Committees continue to act as
transmission belts for important governmental and Party policies, they no
longer function as monitors of pervading political attitudes. In describing
their role, mediators see their primary functions as resolving disputes,
36. Walter Gellhorn, China's Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. OF CHINESE L. 1, 21
(1987)("'[t]he right to be let alone' is 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.' " (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928))).
37. Lubman, supra note 12, at 52.
38. Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L.
RLrv. 1201 (1966); Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in
Communist China, 55 CAuiF. L. REv. 1284 (1967).
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serving their clients under the law, and educating the public on the
meaning of the law for civil cases.39
Today, Chinese Communist policy is directed at legitimizing,
regularizing, and reforming the People's Mediation system, with the intent
to move it away from the role it played during the Cultural Revolution
and thus place the entire mediation process in a more "lawful" context.
Subsequently, the Mediation Committee system is referenced in the most
recent Constitution and in new statutes that describe both the voluntary
nature of the process and the rights that individuals have in mediation.'
In discussing their practice, local mediators stress that their role is
to persuade, to educate, and to promote lawful behavior.4' In attempts to
fulfill this role they may use considerable energy, but current evidence
suggests that the coercion associated with mediation in the past is absent
today.C2 There is a new emphasis on lawful action that seems indicative of
the Reform movement in general. Thus, a lessening, although not
complete withdrawal, of direct Party involvement and politicalization of
the People's Mediation system is apparent. The Party, however, remains
the authoritative body determining social relations.
Furthermore, today individual rights are not prominent elements in
dispute resolution practice. Within the legal system, for example, the
point has been made that:
[e]ven in respect of 'the most fundamental rights,'.. the
meaning... of legal propositions are 'determined through face-
to-face negotiation, mediation, or settlement by direction of an
administrative superior .... In many cases, the last word in
39. In 1988, in a series of presentations and interviews with members of a U.S.
Alternative Dispute Resolution Delegation, Chinese mediators and civil justice administrators
in three cities described the role and functions of the People's Mediation Committees, and of
their practice of mediation. Their presentations emphasized that mediation is a community
service. They describe their most important role as education, on the theory that proper
understanding of society's rules would lead to avoidance of disputes. They take pains,
however, to distinguish their advocacy of social "education," from the political dimensions
of Maoist "education" exemplified by the struggle sessions of the Cultural Revolution.
40. See THE CONST. OF THE P.R.C., translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 821204, art. III (1983); CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art.
97-102.
41. Cheng Gang, The Neighbourhood Committee - Resident's Own Organization,
BEIING REV., April 9-15, 1990 at 26.
42. Daniel Southerland, Chinese Boost Birth-Control Campaign; Family Planners to be
Increased, WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 1988 at A19. (One of the most controversial of
Chinese policies has to do with family planning - the government policy of mandating single
child families. When local officials implementing this policy reportedly used extreme verbal
coercion and abuse, and threats of forced abortion and sterilization on women pregnant with
a second child, the national government responded with a policy emphasizing training an
additional twenty-five thousand family planners. "[Flamily planning workers had been
advised not to use coercion to enforce birth control policies.").
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interpretation of laws.., has been the opinion of the local Party
organization. Its decision is essentially a moral or political
statement and is not a carefully reasoned legal opinion.' 0
Where the meaning of "the most fundamental right" is determined without
reference to legal standards, the potential for disregard of an individual's
rights is real: this seems to be the condition under which contemporary
domestic mediation functions in the People's Republic. The most recent
Constitution has sections specifically addressing an individual's rights; and
the mediation statutes clearly state that mediation is a voluntary process in
which participation shall not be compelled. 4 However, descriptions of the
mediation process by participants suggest a strong component of advocacy
by mediators. Mediator advocacy, in turn, rests on the perception that the
mediator's role is one of "education" and "persuasion" toward the correct
conditions of settlement.
Individuals resisting the efforts of mediators are seen as
perpetuating conflict against the interests of the state. Even though
disputants have the right to reject mediation and move to litigation, the
peer pressure of the social group represented by the Mediation Committee
may be very difficult to resist. In fact, one current statistic is that ninety-
eight percent of disputes handled by the People's Mediation Committees
are settled through mediation.' This suggests that mediation may be
necessary to settle domestic and workplace disputes. A mediation process
capable of settling nearly all disputes must be perceived by disputants as
having an extremely high legitimacy. But, high levels of pressure from
peers, social groups, the Party, and government authorities may be
required to achieve such effective results.
C. The Mediation Process
Mediation of domestic or workplace disputes begins either when a
disputant solicits involvement by a Mediation Committee or when an
individual mediator takes the initiative. Reports by concerned individuals
in a neighborhood, village, or workplace may trigger mediator initiated
43. Walter Gellhorn, China's Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. OF CHINESE L. 1, 17
(1987) (quoting R. Randle Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in China,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 46 (R. Edwards, L. Henkin & A. Nathan eds.
1986).
44. CIVIL PRocEDuRE LAw, supra note 11, art. 14 ("Under conditions prescribed by
law and in accord with the principle of voluntary participation, the People's Mediation
Committees conduct mediation work .... ") (emphasis added).
45. This statistic was put forward in meetings with mediators from Mediation
Committees in urban, factory, and rural village settings. These meetings were several
thousand miles apart.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
dispute resolution. Additionally, a committee member may without any
knowledge of a dispute situation routinely visit families to discuss any
potential problems before they might erupt into a serious domestic dispute;
the head of one village mediation committee referred to this process as
"preventive work." 46 State officials report that when a mediator initiates
dispute resolution and then conducts it in a practical manner the process
works well and results in a "good experience."4
According to the law, acceptance and participation in mediation is
voluntary. Accordingly, one section of the Civil Procedure Law states:
"When an Agreement is attained through mediation, it must be based on
the willingness of both parties; compulsion is not permitted" (emphasis
added). 4 Yet, it is difficult to determine the current standard of practice
by mediators who face parties who would rather go to court, or otherwise
reject mediation. If a Mediation Committee feels that a dispute's effect
will extend beyond the disputants, it will put a reasonable degree of
pressure on the parties to mediate. The voluntary nature of mediation is
probably less clear to individuals in community settings because they
perceive themselves as being integrated in a local social group or the local
government, both of which the Mediation Committee is a unit.
After the parties have accepted a mediator, the active mediation
process begins. It has three elements: investigation, analysis, and the
action component. In the Chinese model the mediator engages in fact-
finding to enable him or her to determine the "right or wrong" involved in
the case. Then the mediator defines a strategy and tries to persuade the
parties to accept a settlement. Mediators may spend considerable time in
meetings with the parties; some mediation efforts may last one or two
years. In one case, the mediator spent more than a year working with the
parties. The aggrieved party, who was a boy that had threatened to scar
the face of his cousin after being informed that he could not marry her,
ultimately withdrew his threats and ended his anger. He said that the
mediator's personal involvement, which included bicycling the distance
between the parties each week for the entire year, convinced him of the
social importance of ending his threats and settling his grievance.9
46. Cheng Su Hua, Address at the Yu Tang Township Mediation Committee, Chendu
City (June 8, 1988) (It is not known whether such unsolicited home visits are usual in urban
settings as well as in this formerly urban village).
47. It must be assumed that Chinese justice and mediation officials briefing visitors are
mostly representing official images of their work. Most of their statements are uncritical
and unreflective, and cannot be taken at face value. However, the same statements can
validly be assumed to reflect the government's idealized vision of how it would like its
dispute resolution system to function. See also supra note 38.
48. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 100 (emphasis added).
49. Presentation of a mediation case to a tour of U.S. professionals in alternative
dispute resolution, Nanjing Machine Tool Works (June 2, 1988).
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The mediators themselves describe their own practice as requiring
persuasion, education, and persistence. They become a part of each case
as they invest time and energy into building trusting relations with the
parties and instilling a sense that they, as mediators, represent the social
environment which means they must exhibit a caring and positive feeling
for the situation of the disputants.
Settlements made with the help of the People's Mediation
Committees, are often informal and not written. Sometimes agreements
are written, but these are not directly enforceable documents. Where
negotiated settlements cannot be reached, or where they are reached and
then violated, parties may turn to the People's courts. These courts also
have a formal mediation process.
D. In-Court Mediation
The average citizen in China is skeptical and distrustful of
litigation and of court adjudication of disputes. Prior to the initiation of
the Reform in 1978, these traditional reservations were reflected in the
Communist Party's deemphasis of written law, its disregard for a
professional judiciary, its violent attacks on legal institutions - including
their personnel, and its reliance on the People's Mediation Committees as
the primary civil dispute resolution system.sm When the social and political
reforms began in 1978, these reservations were reversed as the institutions
were given more credibility than at any other time since the ascent of the
Communist government. The new emphasis on legality, has not, however,
led to a corresponding decline in importance for the People's Mediation
Committee system; the system is still the first line for domestic dispute
resolution. Furthermore, the legal emphasis has not disturbed the role of
mediation within court processes. Mediation, which is an established duty
of the court, is the topic to which we now turn.
China is not a litigious society; today, most civil cases are settled
in the mediation processes. Compared with American courts, few civil
and economic disputes are litigated in China. The creation of legally
50. Presentation by a Judge of the Beijing High Court to a tour of U.S. practitioners in
alternative dispute resolution (June 1, 1988) (in Beijing, in a recent year, the case load of
the People's Mediation Committees was reported to be six times that of the Beijing Court's
civil calendar, "freeing the court for the most serious cases, and reducing unnecessary
litigation.").
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enforceable civil rights - including property rights - led to a rapidly
growing caseload for the expanding People's Court system5 l
Cases heard by the People's Courts generally fall into the
following categories: (1) criminal cases, (2) civil cases where disputants
reject People's Mediation Committee efforts, (3) economic contract
disputes that may involve individuals, state enterprises, or administrative
agencies, and (4) economic cases involving foreign investment. In
virtually all of these categories, courts are instructed to attempt settlement
through means other than adjudication. While in roughly seventy percent
of the civil cases mediated settlements obviate the need for judicial
decisions, analysis of the process suggests that court mediated decisions
may reflect a high degree of compulsion or possibly coercion to settle.
Case outcomes are frequently court confirmed settlements rather than
court orders.
Whereas United States (U.S.) court procedure is regulated by the
adversarial process, Chinese litigation places the court in a dialogue
between the parties. With few exceptions, U.S. court procedure requires
judges to maintain distance from the parties, to avoid ex parte contacts, to
direct exchanges on the merit of positions, and to preserve their neutrality
in the cases before them. Civil and criminal procedures in the U.S.
require judges to evenhandedly manage the adversarial process. Judges in
the U.S. are taught to adjudicate cases before them, but not to jawbone
parties into settlements.
In China, the role of the court is different. Chinese courts see
themselves as fact-finders who decide right or wrong, and as facilitators,
who create settlement conditions between litigating parties. This second
function is regarded as so much a part of the court's role that it is labelled
"in-court mediation," and has become a statutory function of the court.
The Civil Procedure Law requires that: "In trying civil cases, the People's
Courts should stress mediation; when mediation efforts are not effective,
the court should issue its decision in a timely manner. " s' The emphasis is
clear: mediation is a duty of the court. If it is possible that parties may
settle, then the court is obliged to aid mediation. If the parties reject
mediation, then the court should not prolong its effort nor coerce
51. Whitmore Gray & Henry R. Zheng, General Principles of Civil Law in the
People's Republic of China, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 27; Tong Rou,
The General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC: Its Birth, Characteristics, and Role, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 151.
52. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 97 ("If a civil case . . . can be
mediated, the court should, based on an examination of the facts and on distinguishing
between right and wrong, conduct mediation and urge the parties to understand each other's
positions and reach an agreement.").
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settlement, but should move to its adjudicatory function and issue its
decision.
The Civil Procedure Law statutes include other guides for the "in-
court mediation" process. The statutes require mediation to be a voluntary
process and prohibit the court from using compulsion to gain a mediated
settlement. 3 Furthermore, mediation is to be conducted by a single judge
or a panel of judges. ' Mediated settlements may be entered as enforceable
decrees of the court, which are signed by a judge and clerk of the court.5s
Finally, statutes allow for appellate courts to also mediate cases. If a
settlement is reached in an appellate court, then the decision of the trial
court may be set aside.5 '
The emphasis on avoiding compulsion in court mediation is
significant. In Communist China, an independent judiciary has not been
considered because it would be viewed as incommensurate with the notion
of the Party as the sole source of legitimacy. Party Committees appoint
judges who are responsive to the Party as well as to the government.S
Judicial decisions reflect local government and Party Committee views, as
well as views of the relevant "mass organizations," such as neighborhood
or workplace committees. As Zhang noted:
Court adjudication of responsibility contract disputes has not been
only a matter of law and [Party] policy. Judicial decisionmaking
also has been based on the opinions of local government officials.
Deference to local government bureaucrats ... is a reflection of
the political realities of Chinese society. In comparison to the
dominant institution of the Party and the powerful Chinese state
bureaucracy, the judiciary wields little or no power 5'
Judicial decisions in civil matters are "socialized" in the sense that
they are seen as elements of a social process, which is designed to educate
the community. In this system, the affected community participates
directly in the judicial process. Judges often visit the sites of disputes or
53. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 100.
54. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 98.
55. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 101.
56. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11, art. 153.
57. Phyllis L. Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors that Guide Chinese Courts in the
Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1989, at 101 ('Party domination of judicial affairs has characterized political-
judicial relations since the founding of the PRC. Judicial independence.., has never
existed in practice .... But there is reason to believe that the Party today no longer
systematically intervenes in all, or the great majority of, civil lawsuits .... However, the
search for norms or other factors that guide judges must be anchored in the
acknowledgement that they may frequently or occasionally be secondary or irrelevant in a
judicial system that is still very closely controlled by members of the ruling political elite.').
58. Id. at 139.
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crimes, and take direct testimony from neighbors, workers, mediation
committee members, or Party cadres. Often judges may discover first-
hand political lessons in a case.
The in-court mediation process relies on the tradition of judicial
involvement in swaying a community's or the disputant's sentiments in a
case. Where mediation by the People's Mediation Committees has not
prevented civil litigation, the judge undertakes fact-finding, and
commences mediation. This mediation differs from the nonjudicial
People's Mediation process because the process will result in an
enforceable dispute settlement. Therefore, judges are in a strong position
to "persuade" disputants to accept a preferred settlement. In this setting,
the statutory admonition that prohibits compulsion in mediation must be
viewed as a reaction to abuses.
In many disturbing vignettes from the time of the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76), Fox Butterfield tells of men and women who were
detained, arrested, and beaten.5 9 They received no trial, but based on
flimsy accusations they were sent away for years by the Red Guard.6
Butterfield's stories make clear how complete the power of the Red Guard
was during its ascendancy and how the judiciary was either ignored or
was totally under the Red Guard's influence. In a different vein, Martin
Garbus, describes a major criminal case of embezzlement from a factory.
Here, the judge, who was untrained in law, conducted a judicial process
by relying almost completely on interviews with the defendant's co-
workers, worker committees, and Party cadres. 6 ' After fact-finding, the
judge concluded that the defendant was guilty. A decision to hold a trial
was later made after consultation with a senior judge and Party cadres. As
portrayed by this case, the sole function of the trial is not to determine
guilt or innocence, but to educate the people - a political objective, rather
than a judicial one.
While the thrust of the post-Mao reforms has been to move the
legal system away from stark political control of the judiciary, the 1990
trials of the Tiananmen Square dissidents demonstrated that Party control
remains firm. In those cases the judiciary was engaged in what can only
be called show trials - forums to accept guilty pleadings and to pronounce
predecided sentences. In regard to the 1990 trials of dissidents, the
Chinese government has found it is important to present its actions as
being controlled by established legal procedures. For example, shortly
after the worst events in the summer of 1989, the English newspaper in
59. BUTrTERFIELD, supra note 25, at 399.
60. Id.
61. Garbus, supra note 23, at 399-400 (The judge was a field worker, selected for his
ideologically correct record with the party.).
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Beijing stated that "[lI]ocal courts should ensure that all cases are handled
strictly according to law by making the facts clear and the evidence
conclusive."a "The newspaper noted that the crushing of the
counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing early this month was a struggle
to safeguard the Chinese Constitution and the socialist legal system."o
Of course, the reality of the court system is quite different from
the espousals of procedural fairness discussed above. Yet, the official
rhetoric indicates the importance which is placed on the appearance of due
process and the rule of law in contemporary China. There is more at
work here than simply a desire of the old guard to cloak the deeds in
legality. Today, legal development and reform can be seen in virtually all
arenas in Chinese society except the management of political dissonance.
This evolving legal system is, however, designed more for serving state
interests in promoting respect for authority and for predicating judicial
performance which is important in developing an enterprise system and
for attracting foreign capital.
Despite the abuses, which continue to illustrate that the government
and Party still control the judiciary, the merits of in-court mediation may
be instructive for non-Chinese court systems. After fact-finding, judges
are in a special position to mediate, because parties settle disputes, that
they have become emotionally committed to litigating. There are many
experiments with court-related mediation in the U.S., but the Chinese
experience offers a new model for experimenting in certain litigation
areas. Such experimentation would lead to the development of adequate
procedures, which balance parties' legal rights with the court's interests of
effective administration of justice and equitable dispute resolution.
E. Commercial Dispute Resolution
When China made economic growth a priority in the 1980's, it
created new policies and laws supporting foreign investment and commer-
cial enterprise. Some of these policies dealt with dispute resolution in
commercial activities. The Chinese legislature deemed enhancement of
formal, and internationally-approved, commercial dispute processing
institutions as necessary additions to China's laws.
Prior to 1978, with the exception of the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission (1954) and the Maritime Arbitration Commission (1958),
commercial dispute settlement practice in China was limited to informal
negotiation and mediation. Submission of a commercial dispute to the
62. Top Court Calls for Quick Trials, CHINA DAILY, June 22, 1989, at 1.
63. Id.
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court was an unusual circumstance. Until the reform period, the two
arbitration commissions, which had been created in the 1950's to enable
China to participate in international trade, did not actually arbitrate
disputes nor issue awards, except in a handful of cases. 4 Actually, Mao's
government was not interested in actively developing international
commercial activities or such institutions. Under the new laws and policies
since 1978, the government has, however, developed the necessary legal
infrastructure to facilitate commercial development and commercial
dispute resolution. New economic courts now adjudicate disputes
involving enterprise relationships, while new arbitration tribunals have
been established in the major foreign investment areas. Mediation
remains the primary state sponsored means for dispute settlement, but it is
now placed in a legal context where arbitration and the judicial process
are alternatively available.
To support its goals of achieving modem economic development,
China's government has adopted a number of new laws that provide an
infrastructure of legal rights and duties for all commercial transactions."
For example, the Economic Contract Law which establishes the principles
of China's contract law, specifies the contractual rights and duties of
"legal persons" and establishes the basis for individual entrepreneurship,
in contracts with either state enterprises or communes.6 The Joint Venture
Law establishes the basis for foreign investment in cooperation with state
and provincial enterprises." Finally, Foreign Economic Contract Law
64. Jerome A. Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Cooperation with China, in
FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 508-
31 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987).
65. Writers on Chinese commercial law reference the term "conciliator" in preference
to "mediator," perhaps to distinguish their process from the practices of the People's
Mediation Committees. Interviewed officials of a Chinese Arbitration Commission indicated
they practice both conciliation and mediation, but were unable to distinguish between the two
processes.
66. See, e.g., LAw OF THE P.R.C. ON JOINT VENTURES USING CHINESE AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of the People's Republic of China
(University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 790708
(1979) [hereinafter JOINT VENTURE LAW]; FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, translated in, II Statutes and Regulations of the People's
Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers)
Ltd.) No. 850321 (1985) [hereinafter FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW].
67. ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF THE P.R.C. translated in, I Statutes and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of
Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 811213.1 (1981), [hereinafter ECONOMIC CONTRACT
LAW].
68. JOINT VENTURE LAW, translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of the People's
Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers)
Ltd.) No. 790708 (1979).
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along with other statutes, establishes a new framework for commercial
relations and foreign investment.69
Without these statutes, which establish both parties' legal rights or
duties and an apparatus by which to settle disputes, foreign investors
would not be assured that China offers an adequately stable legal and
political environment to protect the investments. Indeed, during the
Cultural Revolution a well-known dispute arose between the Anglo-
German company Vickers-Zimmerman and a provincial enterprise."0 When
Vickers-Zimmerman called for international arbitration, which was a term
of the contract, the Red Guard deported one company representative,
imprisoned another for three years, and had the court levy a fine on the
company that was equivalent to the damages the company had argued it
suffered.7' The case destroyed China's credibility in the international
commercial community.
The new commercial laws reveal the Chinese preference for
mediation prior to enforceable dispute settlement. These laws also indicate
a preference for settling commercial disputes through arbitration instead of
litigation. From a Chinese perspective, commercial relations extend over
time; disputes are characterized by mutual accommodation for the sake of
the continuing future relationships. Consequently, litigation which is an
adversarial process, may be tantamount to ending the commercial
relationship.71 This preference for arbitration versus litigation is evidenced
by the prevalence of arbitration as the primary dispute settlement
mechanism in the new statutes.
The Foreign Economic Contract Law and the Joint Ventures Law
provide for arbitration of contracts before a Chinese arbitration body or, if
a contract so specifies, before an international arbitration body. ' These
two statutes require dispute resolution by the Chinese courts even if
69. FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW, translated in, II Statutes and Regulations of
the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 850321 (1985).
70. Jerome A. Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Cooperation with China, in
FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 508
(Michael J. Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987).
71. Id. at 508-31.
72. William T. O'Hara, Dispute Resolution in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the People's Republic of China, R.I.B.J., February 1985, at 4, 7.
73. FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW, translated in, II Statutes and Regulations of
the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 850321 (1985). JOINT VENTURE LAW, translated in, I Statutes and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of
Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 790708 (1979).
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arbitration is not included in the contract. 4 Thus, commercial arbitration
as a means of dispute resolution is implied in all joint-venture contracts
approved by the Chinese government. The Economic Contract Law,
applying to Chinese enterprises, provides options for the settlement of
disputes between provincial enterprises and other "legal persons."7s These
options are mediated by the government agency regulating the commercial
activity, arbitration, and litigation.
[W]hen a dispute arises... concerned parties should promptly
settle the dispute through consultations. When an agreement
cannot be reached through consultations, any one of the concerned
parties may apply to the contract control authorities . . . for
mediation or arbitration or a suit may be initiated directly in the
People's Court.7'
Arbitration in commercial disputes has been enhanced by the
development of formal arbitration procedures that are comparable to the
procedures used in other Chinese arbitration practices and by the creation
of new arbitration commissions.' 7 Formerly, all trade disputes were
submitted to arbitration in Beijing. Now, each of the Special Economic
Zones has its own arbitration commission, making the dispute settlement
74. FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW, No. 880413.1 which provides:
In the case where any dispute arises between Chinese
and foreign cooperators over the implementation of a
contract of cooperative enterprise, it shall be settled
through consultation or reconciliation. If the Chinese
and the foreign cooperators are unwilling or fail in
their attempt to solve the dispute through consultation
or reconciliation, they may submit the case to
arbitration by an arbitration organization in China or
to other arbitration organizations in accordance with
the provisions on arbitration in the contract of
cooperative enterprise or any written arbitration
agreement reached after the signing of the contract.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW, translated in, V Statutes and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 880413.1 (1988).
75. ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF THE P.R.C. translated in, I Statutes and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of
Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 811213.1 (1981) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CONTRACT
LAW].
76. ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF THE P.R.C., translated in, I Statutes and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of
Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 811213.1, art. 48 (1981).
77. Charles Pettit, Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China, 39 ARB. J. 3
(1984) ("[T]he Provisional Rules of Procedure are, for the most part, conspicuously clear,
comprehensive, flexible, orderly, and well set out .... In general, one could say that the
Chinese rules would form an adequate modus operandi for a tribunal in New York or
London.").
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process more available to foreign investment and trade. Although formal
arbitration is favored over litigation as a means of settling commercial
disputes, the Chinese clearly regard formal arbitration as a last resort and
seem to prefer mediation over arbitration. "Chinese negotiators still regard
the arbitration process with distrust due to an ancient cultural aversion to
settling disputes by litigation. A preferred method is 'talking disputes into
harmony' through mediation. "73
As in the case of family or workplace relations, the Chinese regard
commercial relations as long term commitments where difficulties are
resolved in consideration of an ongoing future relationship. The Chinese
approach to commercial relations for dispute settlement emphasizes a
mutual adjustment in the parties' proposed positions. This "friendly
consultations" approach is regarded as the first step in commercial dispute
resolution. Parties are urged to maintain flexibility, to avoid defending an
"abstract principle," to reach for accommodation, and to avoid "defining
the problem."79 If there is a failure to settle a dispute by themselves, then
Chinese tradition emphasizes the need for parties to bring in a mediator to
help resolve the dispute.
The emphasis on negotiated settlement is so strong that various
levels of mediation may be identified. First, there is direct negotiation by
the concerned parties to settle their dispute; this is called "friendly
consultations."" Second, an attempt to mediate may be made by a secon-
dary party to the contract." This secondary party will intervene because it
will be affected by the dispute, but not because it is one of the disputants.
A third level occurs when a Chinese administrative agency or arbitration
commission is asked to arbitrate the case.' 2 Finally, the parties may
choose court adjudication. 3
If the contract involved in dispute specifies arbitration and
"friendly consultations" have failed, then the disputants may approach the
arbitration commission. Thus, the arbitration process begins with an
immediate effort to mediate the dispute. Mediation is not perfunctory, but
is perceived as a primary function of the arbitration process.
Consequently, mediation is continued throughout the entire dispute
resolution process. If a negotiated settlement is not reached, then the
78. WALTER S. SURREY & STEPHEN M. SOBLE, Recent Developments in Dispute
Resolution in the People's Republic of China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA 373, 378 (Jerome A. Cohen ed. 1983).
79. Roderick W. Macneil, Contract in China: Law, Practice, and Dispute Resolution,
38 STAN. L. REv. 303 (1986).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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arbitration panel will undertake the traditional approach, which includes
fact-finding and opinion development. Again, the panel will never cease in
its settlement efforts. Mediation continues even after the arbitration comm-
ission makes a determination on the merits of the dispute, although it may
not have decided an appropriate remedy." Often, the arbitration panel
communicates its decision to the parties, which usually leads to one side
wanting to settle.
The emphasis placed on negotiated settlements is illustrated by the
statistics from a regional arbitration commission. Of fifty-four resolved
cases initially submitted to the commission for arbitration, only eighteen,
thirty-three percent, were settled after undergoing the complete arbitration
process. The other two-thirds of the cases did not result in an arbitration
decision because the plaintiffs either withdrew their arbitration request
during the mediation process (which occurred in twenty-four percent of
the cases) or the disputes were resolved through mediation (which
occurred in forty-three percent of the cases). ss
The development of an institutionalized legal framework for
commercial dispute resolution has enabled China to become a modem
commercial and industrial state. The ancient emphasis on accommodation
and maintenance of existing relationships, which has been adopted by the
Chinese in regards to commercial relations, is also pivotal in the
arbitration process as well as the court systems, where mediated
settlements are now the goal. Arbitration and adjudication are always
available as a means of dispute settlement, but the major emphasis of
agency or court officials is toward promoting mediated or negotiated
settlements.
V. REFORM OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Law reform since 1978 reflects an intent by political leaders to
change the character of state and Party relations, which were first
established by Mao Zedong. Mao emphasized the need for the creation of
a new law and application of existing law through "mass lines" and "mass
organizations." Since 1978, the Party has deemphasized these Party
organs. Whereas Mao promoted antibureaucratic attitudes and supported
84. See generally Jerome A. Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Cooperation
with China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC
OF CHINA 508-31 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987).
85. Deputy Director of the Shenzhen Bureau of Justice Su Jan, Presentation on
Shenzhen Arbitration Commission, June 12, 1988.
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the doctrines of continuous revolution and class struggle, the reformers
rejected these ideas as ill-suited to China's current developmental stage.
They replaced the old ideas with a technical and rational legitimacy of
law. Furthermore, the reformers supported the development of written
laws, an administrative government, a functional judicial institution, and
the reorganization of the legal profession. From Mao's charismatic
leadership, China moved into, the 1980's with a Weberian rational-legal
outlook defining its socio-political paradigm.s
6
The simplest explanation for this new emphasis on active law
making and law development is that it was a necessary step towards
achieving the goals of the government. These goals, labeled as the "four
modernizations" were agriculture, science and technology, industry, and
national defense. By the late 1970's, the political leadership understood
that internal economic development and foreign investment would be
restricted by an underdeveloped legal infrastructure or by a legal system
that has been left in pieces by the effects of the Cultural Revolution."
In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, civil law was in
disarray; there was little substance in the judiciary or other dispute
processing institutions. The new leadership turned to rebuilding China's
legal institutions. This change is reflected in the pragmatic approach the
leadership took in stabilizing social relations, rejecting Maoist analysis
regarding the continuity of social and class conflict. This new direction,
taken since 1978, is evident (1) in the creation and modification of the
new national constitutions (1978 and 1982), (2) in the passage of the first
Civil and Criminal Codes since the Revolution, (3) in the passage of a
series of economic laws, which advance commercial transactions and
economic development, (4) in the re-creation of judicial administration and
judicial institutions, (5) in a new emphasis on training personnel in law,
and (6) in new methods of disseminating the law to the people. These
developments are introduced in the following sections.
A. Constitutional Reforms
86. HARDING, supra note 2, at 184.
87. SHAU-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 36 (1985) ("After the 'lost decade' of chaos and struggle, China
badly needs a regular legal order to ensure stability, unity, and an orderly environment
essential to the successful development of its economy.").
88. Whitmore Gray & Henry R. Zheng, General Principles of Cvil Law in the
People's Republic of China, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 27; Tong Rou,
7he General Principles of Cvil Law of the PRC: Its Birth, Characteristics, and Role, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 151.
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Communist China's original Constitution, drafted in 1954, was
revised in 1975 to incorporate the principles of the Cultural Revolution.
Certain liberal sections of the earlier document were deleted in the 1975
revision. Legal maxims such as "all citizens are equal before the law,"
"presumption of innocence," and "rule of law" were rejected. Institutions,
such as the jury system, public trials, legal defense, and the Procuracy,
were deleted or severely curtailed. The 1975 Constitution promoted the
"dictatorship of the proletariat," identified the Party as the same as
government, and stressed rule by "mass line" and "mass organization" -
the principles of Mao.
In 1978, after Mao's death, the new leadership quickly produced a
new Constitution, restoring many of the 1954 provisions on legality and
individual rights which had been deleted in the 1975 version. The new
Constitution revived an individual's right to an open trial, but failed to
restore the 1954 provisions concerning equality before the law and
independence of the courts. "Judicial independence" and "equality before
the law" resurfaced after the 1978 Constitution.
After the 1978 Constitution was drafted, it became apparent, that
the new leadership, namely Deng Xiaoping, dissatisfied with the
Constitution, leaned more toward reform and away from Maoism.
Consequently, Xiaoping decided that the recent revision of the
Constitution was inadequate to facilitate modernization and economic
development."' The Constitution was amended in 1979. Then a new
Constitution was drafted in 1982.90 The latest version is a reformist
document: it makes a clear distinction between the state and the
Communist Party. Furthermore, it contains what may be considered a
substantial and unprecedented movement toward separation of the
legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government. In the new
Constitution, the courts are declared independent of other organs of the
state9n and new sections regarding individual rights are added. This new
version also attempts to institutionalize the law by establishing that the
Constitution itself, and the corresponding statutory law, are the only
sources of law in the states, and by providing for the separation of
powers, as described above. 92 Accordingly, the preamble states that "the
constitution. . . is the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal
89. Wu Jianfan, Building New China's Legal System, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
34 (1983).
90. See generally THE CONST. OF THE P.R.C., translated in, I Statutes and Regulations
(University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 821204
(1983).
91. Id. at art. 126, 131.
92. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 42 (1985).
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authority."' Additionally, the text states: "[n]o law or administrative or
local rules and regulations shall contravene the Constitution. No
organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the
Constitution and the law."9 '
In summary, the recent history of the Chinese Constitutions
reflects a rejection of Maoist principles of government; in the place of
Maoist notions is an emerging model of socialist law that, in many
respects, incorporates traditional principles of Western law - rights of
individuals, independence of judicial powers, and decentralization of
political or governmental power. The constitutional language, however,
does not reflect the reality of social life in China or in many other
nations. For example, the statements regarding judicial independence are
not yet enforceable policy and the Party retains the role of judicial
decision maker whenever state or Party interests are affected by a case.'
Officially, China remains committed to the "four principles": "the socialist
road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, leadership by the Communist
Party, and guidance by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Existing Thought" guide
all of China's developments. Reform has gone far, but it is restrained at
points where modem political forces require adherence to past government
policies. For example, individual rights described in the new Constitution,
are generally not enforceable against the state.
B. Legislation and Legal Institutions
In 1976, twenty-eight years after its founding, Communist China
did not have a civil or criminal code nor a regular law making process.
Still, between the time of the revolution and 1978 some fifteen hundred
laws were passed, but codification and systemization of the law was
regarded as antithetical to Maoist principles. In contrast, since 1978 a
detailed revision of existing statutes has been completed, some laws were
deleted for lack of correspondence with the most recent Constitution, and
many laws were revalidated.9 Thus, throughout the period of reform the
93. THE CONST. OF THE P.R.C. preamble, translated in, I Statutes and Regulations
(University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 821204,
art. 5 (1983).
94. Id.
95. See generally SHAo-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-
MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 54 (1985); Stanley Lubman, Western Scholarship
on Chinese Law: Past Accomplishments and Present Challenges, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 83, 94-95 (1983).
96. See, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 11; ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF
THE P.R.C. [ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW], translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China (University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law
(Publishers) Ltd.) No. 811213.1 (1981). FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW, translated
in, I Statutes and Regulations of the People's Republic of China (University of East Asia
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law making process has become experienced and productive in using
regulations to manage an increasingly complex society.
C. Building Legal Institutions
Communist China's legal institutions were created during the
1950's and based on the Soviet model. Development of a formal legal
system halted in the late 1950's with the expulsion of the Soviets and the
initiation of the Anti-Rightist movement. Rejection of government bureau-
cracy was Mao's theme in this Anti-Rightist movement; during the more
significant Cultural Revolution of the 1960's, this theme led to rejection of
the rule-based legal model in favor of Mao's version of mass participation
in the law.
In both the Anti-Rightist movement and the Cultural Revolution,
representatives of the bureaucracy or of established institutions were
forced to leave their positions, moved from their communities, and
sometimes sent to forced labor camps. Thousands of jurists, lawyers, and
others associated with the legal community were purged. In 1959, the
Ministry of Justice - the government bureau supporting the court system
and the legal profession - was abolished. Damage to legal institutions was
severe.
Rebuilding and extending existing legal institutions has been an
important goal of the Reform. In their new emphasis on legality, the
leadership has rejected the personal approach to dispute settlement favored
during the Cultural Revolution; instead, the legal process functions
impersonally by specifying correct judicial and prosecutorial procedures.
The courts have been revived and granted a higher status than in recent
history. Furthermore, the court system has been restructured, revitalized,
and given a new emphasis on professionalism.
The Court System in China has been refined since 1978. Today,
there are four levels in the Chinese courts: the People's Court, serving
rural areas and urban districts within cities; the intermediate courts, taking
appeals from the basic courts and serving as a court of original
jurisdiction for more complex cases; the people's high court, functioning
as the senior court at the provincial level and taking appeals from the
intermediate courts; and lastly the Supreme Court, handling appeals from
the high courts.
Judicial selection occurs through election for the President of the
Court and by appointment for a higher level People's Congress for the
Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 850321 (1985) JoINT VENTURE
LAW, translated in, I Statutes and Regulations of the People's Republic of China (University
of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.) No. 790708 (1979).
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other judges. Because judicial training is required, special institutes have
been created to educate judges in the applicable law.
New courts have been created to serve necessary functions. The
leading example is the new economic courts, functioning at the basic and
intermediate court level. These courts specialize in civil and criminal
cases that arise under the Economic Contract Law and legislation.
In 1979 the Ministry of Justice, which had been abolished twenty
years before, was recreated to manage judicial administration, to aid in
the selection and training of judges, and to promote legal education and
legal development. In 1985, the Procuracy, which is a combined
investigative and prosecutorial office at each level of government,
abolished by Mao in the 1970's, was reinstated. Mao had abolished the
Procuracy in the 1970's. Finally, in the 1980's, centers for legal research
and publication have been developed.
D. Dissemination of Law
Under the socialist model, the law is studied and understood by the
masses. Consequently, Mao made extensive group study compulsory.
During the reform period, the government established new organizations
to disseminate law and utilized newspapers, journals, posters, and
television to introduce the law to the people. Community based
multiservice law centers, the "legal service stations" are located in village
and neighborhood settings. These centers are staffed by one individual
trained in law and by several retired cadres. They disseminate the law,
and assist in dispute resolution by giving advice or initiating mediation. A
staff may also train mediators, act as mediators, or assist with legal
education in the community. 7 The "legal service stations" are located in
some twenty-thousand villages across the country.
VI. CONCLUSION
A study of Chinese mediation and civil dispute processing must
denote the influence of the government and the Communist Party. The
history of complete subjugation of both the People's Mediation system and
the Chinese courts by the Communist Party has been documented by
97. See Walter Gellhorn, China's Quest for Legal Modernity, I J. OF CHINESE L. 1, 9-
10 (1987).
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observers for over two decades. 93 The Tiananmen Square dissident trials
in 1990 demonstrated that the judiciary and the court system remain
directly under the control of the Party, and that statutory pronouncements
of civil rights or due process have yet to be realized in practice. This
paper has, however, presented the thesis that over the past thirteen years -
a period known as the post-Mao Reform period - China has purposefully
moved away from direct Party control over the courts and the mediation
process. Most contemporary experts on China would support this
observation."
Notwithstanding the important special case of the political trials,
the decision in the late 1970's to rebuild China's legal institutions, are
indicative of the leadership's commitment to the creation of viable legal
and mediation systems. For a decade, China has worked to pass a
Constitution and code of law. Old law schools were reopened and new
law schools were built. The People's Court system was developed and the
People's Mediation Committee system was developed and moved into the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the Chinese people
have been committed to participate in international arbitration processes.
The gains over the past dozen years have been substantial. The 1991
Chinese dispute processing institutions are now well developed, but they
continue to be responsive to the concerns of local Party and government
officials.
The People's Mediation Committee system is vast: it involves
some four million people as mediators.1" Originally conceived as a part of
the "mass organizations" of communist government, they have become
more "secular" institutions. Today, China's mediation system is less
focused on ideology and more on its social welfare function.
The mediation committees are best viewed as localized conflict
management centers. In urban neighborhoods, rural villages, and
factories, mediation committees provide a unique approach to dispute
resolution that emphasizes early intervention and personal mediator
involvement in relatively minor civil disputes. From their own accounts,
mediators and supervising government officials describe the major
98. See generally Phyllis L. Chung, Deciding Disputes: Factors that Guide Chinese
Courts in the Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1989 at 101; Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of
Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1966); Lubman, supra note 12.
99. See generally HARDING, supra note 2; Jerome A. Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in
Economic Cooperation with China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 508 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987); Roderick W.
Macneil, Contract in China: Law, Practice and Dispute Resolution, 38 STAN. L. REV. 303
(1986); William T. O'Hara, Dispute Resolution in the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics
and the People's Republic of China, R.I.B.J., February 1985, at 4.
100. Mediation Settles 6.47m Civil Disputes, CHINA DAILY, August 19, 1986, at 1.
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functions of the People's Mediation system as preventing dispute
escalation, maintaining social welfare within communities, and helping
individual disputants resolve their conflicts.' 0' The utility of this system,
stripped of its ideological dimension, is that it serves as a community
based resource for domestic and workplace dispute resolution. Mediation
must be assessed as a community welfare function, and it apparently
remains an extremely viable large scale system. Its achievements in
reducing family violence and neighborhood conflicts must be balanced
with the freedom that individual mediators apparently take in justifying
their early interventions; they snoop, invade privacy, and serve as a
reporting system on the unconventional.
On balance, the People's Mediation Committee system seems to
perform an important role in community based dispute management.
Disputes involving property, significant sums of money, torts, or other
disputes not settled through community mediation are appealed to the
People's Courts. The courts, in turn, employ mediation as part of routine
judicial practice.
Research in Chinese dispute resolution is limited to government
information sources. External researchers do not have independent access
to records or direct observation of cases and the decision processes.
Among scholars and visitors, there has been little opportunity to interview
judges, mediators, and disputants apart from government information
personnel. Official reports and descriptions of the People's Mediation
program and of the People's Courts are limited to highly favorable data.
In these circumstances, independent research is limited in description and
analysis.
This paper has described the beginnings of the rationalization of
Chinese dispute settlement systems; yet, political control of the judiciary
and of the mediation system remains. In the end, the future of dispute
settlement in China will be linked with the country's progress in
establishing protected civil rights. Until political reform results in the
creation of a more independent judiciary and mediation system, based on
protected civil rights, one must review China's dispute settlement
programs with caution; the potential for abuse of their system is
everpresent. Nevertheless, China's approach toward institutionalizing
mediation in the People's Mediation system, in the judiciary, and in
commercial dispute resolution is unprecedented and can be instructive for
our society. More research, with better access, is needed.
101. See supra note 29; see also supra note 46.

